#27 - Global Reference, Must Be True

[Jeremy Press]

Hi Shannon,

I think everyone on the thread is in sympathy with some of the frustration about the wording of answer choice A.

Luke's explanation above is by far the best I've read on how answer choice A accurately describes passage B. I don't have much to add to what he wrote, in fact. He's right that it's the specific wording of the answer choice that allows it to be an accurate description: what is "necessary" endorsement of a viewpoint? It's explicit (irresistible) "giving of approval" to that viewpoint, not just implied agreement with that viewpoint. So the question is, can the second paragraph of passage B possibly be read as just an author's description of a (very) strong argument, without explicitly giving approval to that argument? Yes. Mostly because of the framing (as Luke also notes). The paragraph is a description of "one natural way of reasoning," without implying it's the only way of reasoning, and without explicitly stating that it's the author's adopted/preferred way of reasoning. Just as a pure side note, my personal reading of what LSAC is trying to do here is it's trying to show that an author can sympathetically portray an argument in the best possible light without actually accepting (or lending the author's approval to) that argument himself or herself. The best lawyers do this all the time, when they try to anticipate the other side's best case and then craft the best response to it.

In terms of approach, if you've got good reason to prefer the description of Passage A in answer choice A, and also a good reason to eliminate every other answer choice, then you can make yourself more comfortable with answer choice A's description of passage B by focusing on the term "not necessarily," which only means the endorsement is not entirely a matter of necessity. That's something that's easier to prove than any of the other answer choices provide.

I hope this helps!

Jeremy

[180bound]

This question has been really frustrating. I have read all the explanations and still have not been convinced that passage B did not "necessarily endorse" its argument. It's been admitted that the authors view toward argument might not have been outward or explicit and it was more of an insinuated endorsement, however it seems that we are all agreeing that even the insinuation was quite apparent and to me the fact that it was so apparent was enough for me to determine that it was obviously endorsing its argument. I think it is perfectly possible to endorse something while only insinuating your endorsement for it. My frustration is by no means with the Powerscore staff, but with this question and its wording.

[Jeremy Press]

Hi 180bound,

It's absolutely a frustrating question, but I would say this in response. You can still read the paragraph as not insinuating endorsement, even though it says the way of reasoning being described is "almost...obvious." An "almost obvious" method of reasoning doesn't have to be the right method of reasoning. Here's an example: I look up at the skies day after day, night after night, and I see the sun, moon, planets, and stars "moving" across the sky. One might say an "almost obvious" theory is that the Earth is fixed in its position and the "heavens" are rotating around it. Of course, I'm not endorsing (or even insinuating endorsement for) that theory by calling it "almost obvious." I'm just saying that it's an apparent, simple, even easy way of reasoning about the Earth's relationship to the universe. To be clear, I don't (and wouldn't!) accept that theory. What the example teaches is the flexibility of the term "obvious," and that we have to be careful about what we "read into" an author's statements. Granted, the argument in the last paragraph of the passage sounds a whole lot more persuasive to you than the "Earth is the center of the universe" theory. But that doesn't mean the author is on board, simply because the author called it "almost obvious." I think that's ultimately all I can say to hopefully persuade you and others!

I hope this helps!

[Tajadas]

I understand (begrudgingly, admittedly) why the second half of A is correct. But I don't understand how Passage A espouses a "general view". When I read "There are two principles that are fundamental to a theory of justice regarding property", I understand that to mean that of all the universe's theories of justice regarding property, all of them must be broken down to just two principles, both of which are succinctly listed. The claim reduces the potentially infinite number of theories of justice regarding property into only discrete two constituents components, so I took the view to be both specific and precise. I didn't interpret that as "general".

I could understand that the view is "general" because it is "broad", as it can be applied to any theory of justice regarding property. But I don't understand why the reasoning in the first paragraph is wrong. I'd appreciate any thoughts.

[Rachael Wilkenfeld]

Hi Tajadas,

It's a general theory in contrast to a specific application. That is, the theory could be applied to any one of many situations regarding property---it isn't limited to real property, money, or any other specific type of property. It's a general theory applicable to any type of property, and covers both original ownership and transfer of ownership. It's not limited by space (where the property is located), time (when the transfer occurred), or in scope (how much property there is). There aren't any specific details in Passage A that would make it more than a general theory.

Hope that helps
Rachael

[Agent00729]

I'm confused about A here, specifically when they say "without providing details". What exactly counts as a detail? It's kind of like saying "without elaborating". But it seems to me there're different degrees of elaboration as well as different degrees of providing details. To me, passage A definitely provides details, it's just a question of how detailed it goes. In a sense, almost every passage is kind of like a bunch of "details", though the degree to which they are detailed varies. Isn't that what a passage is/does by nature?

[Agent00729]

For example, aren't the explanations of the two principals of the theory of justice "details" of the theory of justice?

[KelseyWoods]

Hi Agent00729!

It seems like you might be falling down the classic "LSAT rabbit hole of overthinking" a bit--it happens to a lot of us when we're trying to understand this exam! Arguing that almost anything and everything could be considered a "detail" is a bit of a slippery slope: if almost everything is a detail then that would make it virtually impossible for anyone to say something "without providing details" which would mean we've all been using that phrase incorrectly!

So let's think about how the phrase "without providing details" is typically used. One application of similar phrases I can think of is when politicians are talking about their policy ideas. People will often criticize a politician for saying they are going to do something like "cut taxes" without providing details about how exactly they plan to cut taxes and how they're going to cut spending to make up for the decrease in taxes. "Details," then, as commonly used, refers to the specifics or particulars of a subject.

The overall argument of Passage A is not just that there are two principles fundamental to a theory of justice regarding property. The author's main argument is that we need a third--the principle of rectification--added to the principles of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. The author states: "A principle of rectification would use historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them, and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, to produce a description of the property ownership that should have resulted." That's a general view and it sounds good, but the author has offered no details about how it would actually work. What type of historical information would be deemed sufficient to prove that injustice had occurred? How are we defining injustices? If something was legal at the time but now considered morally abhorrent, does that constitute an injustice? Or is only an injustice if the laws of the time were violated? How do we determine what property ownership should have resulted? These are all questions that require details to explain how this principle could be practically applied. Passage A offers none of these details. It gives us the general view, but no specifics as to how to apply it.

Hope this helps!

Best,
Kelsey

[Agent00729]

Thanks, that helps! It's difficult because I feel like sometimes the questions require us to overthink and sometimes they require us to take it at face value. I guess that's why we practice!

[bruceg]

I chose (A). I saw the phrase that author B "doesn't necessarily endorse" to mean that, ideally we would give the land back, which I took to be the author's opinion. They later affirm this opinion in the final sentence, not attributing it to anyone else.

But the author stopped short of endorsing taking action on that ideal, noting instead it may be impractical.