- Wed May 28, 2025 11:11 am
#113018
Hi jona,
In this question, the "accurate information" refers to the actual market estimate of candidate X winning, which is very low since this candidate is a long-shot.
When several investors invest large sums of money on candidate X, they are basically trying to "trick" the market into believing that candidate X is suddenly a better candidate. Since the well-informed traders know that candidate X is a long-shot, they sell their contracts for candidate X for a profit. This buying/selling pattern is what then informs the rest of the market that candidate X is still a long-shot (the accurate information).
Even though the well-informed traders were the ones who made the profit, that's not really what this question means by disseminating the accurate information. The idea is that the "inaccurate information" (that candidate X may be more likely to win than previously thought based on the new investments for this candidate) is quickly exposed/corrected by the well-informed investors through their selling behavior. The market quickly reacts to this buying/selling pattern and "updates" the market value of candidate X to the more accurate estimate of the candidate's chance of winning (rather than the artificial "blip" caused by the large investments).
The scenario presented in this question basically parallels the experiment that is described in paragraph three of Passage A. This paragraph begins "Markets are highly 'efficient,' in the sense that the market as a whole learns—lightning fast and very accurately— what informed people know." The experiment that follows in that paragraph and the situation described in this question both show how the market quickly learns the "truth" that the well-informed people know.